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PROTECTING STUDENT RIGHTS PROMOTES
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: A RESPONSE
TO JUDGE WILKINSON
Nadine Strossen, Second Panelist*
The conference brochure states the following as the first question for
discussion, and I am quoting, "What are the real-world consequences of
due process decisions broadly expanding the right to challenge... the
determinations of local public officials?" I am going to answer that
question, but I am going to do so by focusing on its unstated but logi-
cally necessary counterpart question, namely, what are the real-world
consequences of broadly expanding the power of local public officials to
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without any procedural
protections?
Judge Wilkinson has talked about the dangers of constitutionalization.
I would like to focus on the dangers of the lack of constitutionalization,
especially when we are considering public institutions, which, by defini-
tion, are unconstrained by market forces. Therefore, the only possible
constraint on their abuse of power, their deprivation of individual liberty,
is constitutional constraint. My points are broadly applicable to all of the
specific subjects to be considered during this conference, not only the
public schools.
I agree with Judge Wilkinson, of course, that we are witnessing
frustrating problems throughout our society, including our schools -
notably the distressing levels of violence and crime. But too many
government officials and citizens, in their desperation to solve seemingly
intractable problems, seek illusory quick fixes that will not, in fact, fix
anything at all. And, as usual, the customary scapegoats are brought
forward, namely, individual rights and the actions of those of us either
practicing before the courts or the courts themselves, who seek to honor
and enforce those individual rights.
Interestingly, Judge Wilkinson began his remarks by stating that there
are many problems, many complex factors that feed into our current
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disciplinary problems in the schools and in society at large. He noted that
it was probably unfair to single out courts and laws, but then he proceeds
to do exactly that.
It reminds me of something that Mark Twain once reportedly said:
when the only tool you have available is a hammer, all problems start to
look like nails. So, with due respect, I am not surprised that a judge and
a lawyer would seek to focus on courts and laws, even though they do
not afford the most important solution - if, indeed, any solution at all
- to the problem of violence in our schools.
This band-aid approach is doubly flawed. It is both unprincipled and
ineffective. That it is unprincipled to deny individual rights for the
purported, goal of promoting order or discipline, or some other social
good, is apparently a fundamental tenet among Federalist Society mem-
bers as well as among American Civil Liberties Union members. Ac-
cording to the conference brochure, a founding principle of the Federalist
Society is "that the State exists to preserve freedom." Accordingly, the
purpose of public schools, along with all other government institutions,
is to preserve freedom and not to maintain order or anything else.
Education is, indeed, an essential prerequisite for all citizens to be able
to realize their equal rights under the law. It is "the great equalizer," in
the words of the United States Department of Education.'
It is the special responsibility of federal courts in our governmental
system to guarantee that other government institutions do not unjustly
deprive citizens of their rights. This responsibility is particularly impor-
tant when the victims of government abuses are relatively powerless. In
the public schools, the victims of official abuses are among the most
powerless members of our society. They are children and teenagers, many
of whom are also poor, disabled, or members of racial minorities.
So, number one, denying liberty to these young people is an unprin-
cipled approach to solving problems of discipline in the schools. Second,
denying liberty is as ineffective a strategy as it is unprincipled. It reminds
me of a sadly prophetic warning that Thomas Jefferson conveyed to
James Madison more than 200 years ago:2 "A society that will trade a
little liberty for a little order will deserve neither and lose both." Indeed,
this" insight has proven painfully true in the context of the public schools.
Let me remind you of the minimal due process guarantees that the
Supreme Court set out in Goss v. Lopez,3 because I think they have been
1. See Brief of NAACP and Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae
at 10-11, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (citing Office of Education report entitled
Equality of Educational Opportunity) [hereinafter "Goss Arnicus Brief"].
2. See Editorial, Factoring in Civil Rights, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 29, 1991, at 4.
3. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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somewhat overblown in the paraphrasing we have heard. All that the
Supreme Court required was that some notice of the charges against a
student be provided. Notice could be given orally either before or after
the suspension or discipline took place. Moreover, the only other thing
the Court guaranteed was the right to respond to those charges informally.
Again, the response could be given after the suspension. These are hardly
earth shattering procedural guarantees. Experience shows that denying
students even these minimal safeguards not only impairs their vital rights,
but also makes no positive contribution to a sound educational environ-
ment.
To the contrary, experts agree that punishing students without
procedural safeguards will increase any negative attitudes or behavior on
the part of those students and will have a detrimental effect both on the
school and ultimately on society at large. For example, the Teachers
College at Columbia University conducted a study in 1970, at the thresh-
old of the due process revolution.4 This study demonstrates that before
this revolution we had a crisis in our schools related to the absence of
due process guarantees. This study, Civic Education in a Crisis Age,
concluded:
A large majority of the students feel they are regularly subjected to
undemocratic decisions... and hence are becoming increasingly
frustrated and alienated by school. Students are not forming a
reasoned allegiance to a democratic political system, because they
receive no meaningful experience with such a democratically
oriented system in their daily lives in school. We must teach the
viability of democratic modes of conflict-resolution, and win respect
for these as just and effective.'
I would now like to amplify the core principles I have just outlined
by making some specific points about the role of procedural due process
in public school discipline. I will state all these points now, and then I
will elaborate as much as time permits.
First, procedural safeguards are necessary to reduce unfair, arbitrary,
and biased disciplinary measures. These measures have permanent
adverse consequences for students. Second, procedural safeguards are
necessary to reduce racial discrimination in administering school disci-
pline. Third, even after the Supreme Court's decisions in Goss and other
4. See Goss Amicus Brief at 12 (citing DEAN MURPHY, Crvc EDUCATION IN A CRISIS
AGE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REPRESSION AND REVOLUTION: SUMMARY OF A RESEARCH
PROJECrTO DEVELOP OBJECTIVES FOR A NEw Civic EDUCATION CURRICULUM FOR AMERICAN
SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN THE 1970s (1970)).
5. Id.
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cases, public schools still often engage in unfair and arbitrary treatment
of students, as well as racial discrimination, in meting out discipline.
Fourth, it follows that, far from having too many procedural protections
and rights, public school students do not have enough safeguards against
arbitrary official conduct. Fifth, there is no evidence that harsh penalties
do any good, either for the student who is punished or for others in the
school community. On the contrary, much evidence suggests that harsh
penalties are counterproductive, especially when unaccompanied by
procedural safeguards. Sixth, respecting individual rights is even more
important in the public schools than in society at large. Seventh, the
notion that things would be better if only we could roll the clock back to
the good old days before the procedural due process revolution reflects
an inaccurate, romanticized notion of pre-due process reality. They were
hardly good old days for many who only now have meaningful access to
public education.
I will now briefly discuss several of these points. First, procedural
safeguards are necessary to reduce arbitrary treatment. Judge Wilkinson
asked how great is the risk that discretion will be abused by school
officials. I can answer that unqualifiedly. It is not a risk; it is a certainty.
The experience of those who worked in the public schools before the due
process revolution demonstrated this.
A 1972 article in the Journal of Law and Education by two individ-
uals who worked with the New York Civil Liberties Union's Students'
Rights Project summed it up well. It explained that the pattern of arbi-
trary suspensions and expulsions revealed the fundamentally custodial
attitude of the public schools toward children who are black or Puerto
Rican and poor. It revealed a system of segregation so thoroughly refined
that mere physical separation, Southern-style, was not necessary in order
to maintain pervasive inequality. And it revealed that what had for years
been characterized as a drop-out problem was
in fact a push-out problem.... [A]lmost all [the complaints we re-
ceived] involved procedural problems; the maze of mechanisms
which the schools used to rid themselves of students who present
difficult problems the schools are not prepared to meet or who do
not fit the mold in which the schools operate.6
Second, and clearly related to my first point, procedural safeguards
are necessary to reduce racial discrimination in the administration of disci-
pline. In 1975, Mark Yudof, who is now the Provost at the University of
6. Ira Glasser & Alan H. Levine, Bringing Student Rights to New York City's School
System, I J.L. EDuc. 213, 215-16 (1972).
[Federalist Society
Remarks: Nadine Strossen
Texas, wrote an article about the suspension and expulsion of black
students from public schools entitled "Suspension and Expulsion of Black
Students From the Public Schools: Academic Capital Punishment."7 Along
with nonacademic capital punishment, its academic counterpart has always
been disproportionately meted out to members of racial minorities,
particularly to young African-American males. It is no coincidence that
Goss itself involved the sweeping, indiscriminate suspension of black
students from Columbus, Ohio public schools for allegedly taking part in
demonstrations following Black History Week.
In their amicus brief for Goss, the NAACP and the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference reminded the Supreme Court that school
officials who resisted racial desegregation consistently used suspensions
and other disciplinary measures as an important tool of their resistance.
Indeed, in prosecuting desegregation cases, the Justice Department sought
and obtained court orders expunging students' suspension records and
mandating procedural safeguards before any suspension. In short, history
has shown that public school discipline without due process violates
constitutional guarantees of both liberty and equality.
My third point is that, even after Goss, public schools still engage in
much unfair and arbitrary treatment of students, and much racial dis-
crimination, in meting out discipline. Recent surveys show that many
schools ignore students' procedural protections and impose discipline in
situations where it is clearly inappropriate, including where students are
simply exercising their free speech rights.
The racially discriminatory pattern of school discipline persists, too.
To give just one example from the many, many studies that have docu-
mented these patterns, recent surveys indicate that although black students
constitute sixteen percent of the school population nationwide, they
continue to receive almost twice as many suspensions, roughly thirty
percent.8
These ongoing problems lead to my fourth point. Far from having too
many procedural safeguards, public school students have too few safe-
guards against arbitrary official conduct. In fact, when the Court decided
Goss, school officials did not criticize it, as the dissenting Justices
predicted they would. On the contrary, the main criticism came from the
7. Mark G. Yudof, Suspension and Expulsion of Black Students From the Public Schools:
Academic Capital Punishment and the Constitution, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 374 (Spring
1975).
8. Muriel Cohen, U.S. Public Schools Suspend Blacks at Twice the Rate of Whites; But
Massachusetts Group Reports that State Figures are Consistent with Enrollment, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1988, at A56 (citing a study by the National Coalition of Advocates for
Students).
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civil liberties/civil'rights community, which maintained that Goss did not
provide enough protection for students' rights.
Experience since then has shown that criticism to be well-taken. For
example, this was the conclusion of a 1993 empirical study of school
districts across the country by Donald Stone.9 In addition to finding that
African-American students are suspended at a rate 250% higher than
Caucasian students, the Stone study also found that, in general, sus-
pension was overused and abused.1 Stone therefore urged that suspension
be used only as a last resort, only in emergency situations, and that, even
then, it should be preceded with more extensive procedural due process
guarantees than the Court had required in Goss, including an independent
hearing officer. Interestingly, some recent studies of school disciplinary
problems recommend enforcement of even more stringent limitations on
measures such as suspension, reserving them for truly emergency situa-
tions.
With all due respect to the questioner during the previous discussion,
I do not think that wearing green hair to school happens to present a real
threat to the order and discipline of the school." One might ask not why
the ACLU was defending that student's rightto express his views through
green hair, but rather why the school was wasting taxpayers' resources
and its energies in suggesting that somehow it was interfering with the
educational process for him to do that.
In contrast to the de minimis nature of the school's concern, the
student's interest was the preeminently important one of free expression
on public issues. Green hair has been used to express messages of support
for environmental causes and pacifism, as chronicled in the classic movie,
The Boy with Green Hair. Thus, green hair is the counterpart of the black
armbands that the Supreme Court held protected by public school stu-
dent's First Amendment rights in its landmark ruling in Tinker v. Des
Moines School District.2
Far from depriving school officials of their necessary discretion, as
Judge Wilkinson intimated, Tinker affirmed school officials' power to
suppress expression that constitutes a "material and substantial disruption"
of the educational process. But just as the black armbands in Tinker
constituted no such disruption, neither did the green hair in the more
recent case.
9. Donald H. Stone, Crime & Punishment in Public Schools: An Empirical Study of
Disciplinary Proceedings, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoC. 351 (1993).
10. ld, at 366.
11. See Panel I: Discussion, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 297, 301 (1996).
12. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The ACLU also represented the students in the inker case.
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My fifth point is that there is no indication that harsh penalties do
any good, either for the student who was penalized or for others in the
school community. To the contrary, many experts agree that suspension
is counterproductive from both perspectives. For example, a 1994 book
by Eric P. Hartwig and Gary M. Ruesch concluded:
Although it seems that . . . suspension, expulsion, and other
exclusionary processes may result in a more orderly school environ-
ment, the opposite appears to be more often true. Many students
who have been excluded come back to the school environment at
some point, and as a result of negative feelings, the school may
become a convenient.., object of revenge. 82% of individuals in
prison today are high school dropouts. 3
Likewise, another recent paper, by the Advocates for Children of
New York, indicted all school disciplinary measures, such as suspension,
which superficially focus on symptoms, and which alienate students from
school:
Suspensions inherently increase the chances that students will never
complete their education. Suspended or expelled high school stu-
dents often fail to return to school, joining the thousands of...
public school students who drop out each year. When this occurs,
the long-term costs to society far exceed the short-term cost of
educating even the most difficult young people in the academic and
social skills necessary for productive employment.'
4
Of course, ineffective as measures such as suspension are in any case,
they are even more ineffective when meted out unfairly,'without proce-
dural safeguards. Any time "law and order" is perceived to be unfair,
order breaks down. This point was made by Charles Silberman in his
classic book, Crisis in the Classroom: "Careless punishment in the
schools serves only to breed more defiance and destruction, which breeds
more repression.., especially when accompanied by arbitrariness, racial
prejudice, assumption of student guilt and general disregard of individual
rights."'
5
My sixth point is that respect for individual rights is even more
important in the public schools than in society at large. One of the major
13. ERIC P. HARTWIG & GARY M. RUESCH, DISCIPLINE IN THE SCHOOL 42 (1994).
14. Diana M.T.K. Autin, Prevention and Alternatives: Reducing Out-of-School Suspen-
sions, at 1 (1992) (position paper for Advocates for Children of New York) (on file with
author).
15. CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRISIs IN THE CLASSROOM: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION (1970).
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reasons for this conclusion was well stated by Justice Robert Jackson. It
ties in with a concern that was raised by Judge Wilkinson when he
recognized that at some point we do have to give young people rights,
and they have to learn how to exercise them responsibly. But how can
they do that if we shelter them from the experience of responsibly
exercising their rights? As Justice Jackson said, "[Public schools] are
educating the young for citizenship .... [This] is reason for scrupulous
protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual child by the public
schools, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere plati-
tudes. 16 Underscoring this point, the Supreme Court has declared, "The
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools."' 7
Seventh, and I am going to conclude on this point, this romanticized
notion that we used to have good old days before the due process
revolution is really an unfounded myth. In truth, the old days were not
very good, especially for the large number of students who were not
given any meaningful access to the so-called "public schools." I say "so-
called" because many categories of students were wholly excluded from
the public schools, including three-fourths of all minority students at that
time. Yes, we have many problems today, but we are at least looking at
a situation where we do have truly universal access to education. That is
an important gain in terms of both freedom and equal educational
opportunity.
One study that has been widely cited by opponents of the due process
revolution supposedly shows that in 1940 the most serious problems in
public schools were such trivial infractions as talking and gum-chewing,
whereas in 1987 the most serious problems in public schools included
drug and alcohol abuse, pregnancy, suicide, and violent crime. Putting
aside the fact that this supposed study has no empirical foundation, the
actual facts show that, in terms of health, safety, and educational opportu-
nity, young people today are better off than their 1940 counterparts.
For example, in 1940, only 49% of all young people graduated from
high school. Pregnant girls were kicked out. Handicapped, learning-
disabled, and troubled students were warehoused away from public view,
and 75% of all minority and low-income students were excluded alto-
gether.
Today, by contrast, more than 90% of all teenagers are enrolled in
high school and 75% graduate on time, with the largest gains coming
16. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
17. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
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from stressed populations: minorities, students with disabilities, pregnant
girls, and low-income youngsters. Illiteracy today is one-fifth its 1940
level. College enrollment has quadrupled.
I am certainly not arguing that 1994 - anymore than 1940, 1975, or
any other era - is a halcyon time in terms of public schools. To the
contrary, much serious work needs to be done in the school system, not
only to improve students' educational experiences but also to improve
their basic rights. What I am saying, though, is that there is no correla-
tion between increased student rights and decreased educational oppor-
tunities. Actually, the rights revolution has gone hand-in-hand with the
unprecedented opening up of meaningful educational opportunities to all
students, including many who were deprived of such opportunities in the
past. Our ongoing challenge is to carry forward on the path lit by the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education"s exactly forty
years ago tomorrow, namely, to ensure the constitutional rights of all
public school students, and to ensure that all of them receive equal and
adequate educational opportunities.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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